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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to study the influence of family characteristics on 
the governance of small and medium-sized family firms. The study presents and tests a 
theoretical model resorting to data on 151 Portuguese SMEs. The study uses nonlinear 
principal component analysis by alternating least squares, bivariate analysis and cluster 
analysis. Family characteristics influence governance mechanisms and family firms form 
clusters based on family characteristics and governance mechanisms. The results reveal 
that family characteristics are a source of heterogeneity among family firms which cor-
roborates the criticism on family firms’ homogeneity assumption. The identification of 
clusters of firms constitutes a reference for family firms’ definition of governance models. 
The originality of the paper relies on the analysis of specific family characteristics and 
its importance as a source of family firms’ heterogeneity is proven. This study opens 
new insights on family firms’ governance research and may be extended to other family 
characteristics and overall implications on performance.
Keywords: family firms, family characteristics, governance mechanisms, family rituals, 
family reunions, SMEs.
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Introduction
Most businesses worldwide include family firms, especially SMEs. Thus, the success 
or failure of these firms has significant implications for world economic output, em-
ployment and wealth creation (Craig, Moores 2010). Within the context of family firms, 
relationships are based on certain diffuse and non-contractual elements (Miller, Le Bre-
ton-Miller 2006) and family issues and firm issues end up being deeply interconnected. 
The success of the firm depends more on the efficient management of the overlap 
between family and business than on the resources of the family, processes or business 
systems (Chrisman et al. 2003).
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This study differs from previous contributions because it analyzes the effect of rit-
uals and family reunions of small and medium-sized family firms on the governance 
mechanisms used in these firms. The governance of SMEs, particularly family firms, 
remains a largely unstudied topic (Bennedsen et al. 2010; Amore et al. 2011; Chrisman 
et al. 2013). To support this research, we look to the literature on corporate governance 
(Misangyi, Acharya 2014) and agency theory (Jensen, Meckling 1976).
This paper focuses on the family characteristics and governance mechanisms of family 
firms. The objectives are to evaluate the influence of the family prestige and branches 
on the governance arrangements of the firm, and to understand how the relationships 
of trust established between family members, the family rituals and reunions affect 
governance mechanisms. The effects of the sector and the age of the firms on those 
relationships are also studied. To test the hypotheses, we carry out a nonlinear principal 
component analysis by alternating least squares and a bivariate analysis of the relation-
ships between variables. We also perform a cluster analysis to verify whether family 
firms can be grouped according to family characteristics and governance mechanisms. 
The results show that different family characteristics influence governance mechanisms 
and that family firms form clusters based those relationships evidencing heterogeneity 
in family firms (Chua et al. 2012).
The next section presents the theoretical background and hypotheses for the study, fol-
lowed by the conceptual and empirical agenda, analysis and results. The study contains 
a discussion of the results and conclusions.
1. Theoretical background and hypotheses
Family firms
The expression family firm refers to an organization in which most of the ownership 
and management duties are concentrated in a single family or branches of that family 
(Smyrnios et al. 2003; Graves, Thomas 2004). Other authors focus on the family in-
volvement (Deephouse, Jakiewicz 2013).
For the family that owns a SME, the firm serves as a means of achieving several 
economic and non-economic goals (McGuire et al. 2012). Voordeckers et al. (2007) 
show that objectives such as maintaining family control, financial independence, family 
employment and family harmony tend to be more important than maximizing value, 
income, growth and innovation.
Agency theory states that the interests of shareholders and managers diverge as man-
agers who hold the control of business operations will defend their own financial in-
terests (Singla et al. 2014). An important function of governance mechanisms is to 
align the interests of managers with the interests of shareholders. Internal governance 
mechanisms and external family mechanisms operate together and can sometimes re-
place each other (Fernandez, Arrondo 2005; Bennedsen et al. 2007). There are several 
key family characteristics, which include the greater or lesser importance of the family 
brand, the trust relationships established between family members, the rituals adopted, 
and the formal or informal meetings held.
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Family reunions
There is a general conviction in the literature that systems of family governance exert 
a strong influence on the firm (Bennedsen et al. 2010). Family councils often serve as 
a governance mechanism that maintains trust and unity within the family, cultivates its 
values, cares for its assets and provides services to the family. Informal meetings, family 
reunions and councils or assemblies can have an impact on cognitive and affective at-
tributes (Mustakallio et al. 2002). The objective is to instil confidence in the most active 
members of the firm as well as in shareholders with no job or function. These sharehold-
ers participate in decision-making, align their preferences, reduce the risk of conflict 
and create opportunities for successors to know more about the business (Vileseca 2002; 
Jaffe, Lane 2004). Consequently, we can formulate the following hypothesis:
H1: The governance mechanisms of family firms are influenced by family reunions.
Trust relationships
Swift and Hwang (2013) stress the importance of cognitive and emotional trust in 
organizations. These qualities are especially important within family firms (Mitchell 
et al. 2003). Mustakallio et al. (2002) indicate that owners have multiple roles in the 
governance of family firms and that formal and social controls influence the quality of 
strategic decisions. In family firms, the relationships are based, in general, on a high 
level of trust, using informal arrangements of governance based on affection instead of 
utilitarian logic or contractual obligations (Calabrò, Mussolino 2013).
The characteristics of the family firm, combined with the dynamic relationships among 
the members of the owner family, tend to dominate the boards and encourage conserva-
tive attitudes, particularly with regard to business risk (Danes et al. 1999; Hermalin, 
Weisbach 2003). Accordingly, we can formulate the following hypothesis:
H2: The governance mechanisms of family firms are influenced by trust relationships 
among family members.
Family brand
For the first generation, management is usually concentrated in a single person, and 
thus governance does not receive much attention (Mustakallio et al. 2002; Alesina, 
Giuliano 2010). The transfer of ownership between generations and the sustainability 
of family relationships depends on the level of interlacing, and the more intense the 
interlacing, the more effective the ownership transfer (Dennis, Lane 2004). Family firms 
tend to retain interests and values and their activities are usually less complex, while 
personal relationships, both inside and outside the firm, are considered very important 
(Pugliese 2006). The prestigious family confers credibility to the firm, strengthening 
commitments by positively influencing the expectations of stakeholders. Consequently, 
we propose the following hypothesis:
H3: The governance mechanisms of family firms are influenced by the family brand.
Family rituals
Rituals are an important strength in family firms and can be altered or weakened by 
generational changes depending on the mutual trust that exists between members (Steier 
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2001; Astrachan et al. 2002). Issues of family and work are inextricably linked to cul-
tural beliefs, values and norms (Lobel 1991). Thus, discussions at Christmas parties 
or at other similar events become an important family characteristic that affects the 
mechanism of governance in family firms (Johannisson, Huse 2000). We can therefore 
put forward the following hypothesis:
H4: The governance mechanisms of family firms are influenced by family rituals.
Sector and age
Family firms focus on various activities because the founders of firms have found 
opportunities in business areas they generally dominated or knew well. Activity and 
growth influence the family and family business (Sharma et al. 2003; Pérez-González 
2006). The older the firm is, the more generations will have been involved (Sharma 
et al. 2003). The governance of family firms will be different as the control moves from 
the founder to the following generations. We can propose the following hypotheses:
H5: The sector influences the relation between the governance mechanisms of family 
firms and family characteristics.
H6: The age of the firm influences the relation between the governance mechanisms of 
family firms and the family’s characteristics.
Clusters
Family firms differ due to the governance mechanisms adopted and the characteristics 
of the family, among other factors. These factors should enable the clustering of family 
firms into different categories. The analysis of how firms are grouped and the number 
of clusters allows for a better understanding of the business and the role of governance 
mechanisms. Consequently, we propose the following hypothesis:
H7: Family firms can be grouped into clusters revealing different relationships between 
the governance mechanisms and family characteristics.
2. Conceptual and empirical agenda
2.1. The conceptual model
The model relates to the characteristics of the family identified by variables grouped 
into family reunions, trust relationships, family brand and family rituals with the gov-
ernance mechanisms of family firms identified by latent variables labelled as concen-
tration of decision, alignment of interests, involvement in management and openness 
to outside members (Fig. 1).
2.2. Variables of the model
In accordance with the literature, we have selected a total of 20 variables to explain the 
characteristics of the family. The governance of family firms is characterized by a total 
of 9 variables. Two control variables, sector and age of the firm, were also considered. 
Detailed information about the variables and measurement scales is presented in Table 1.
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Table 1. Detailed information about the variables










Branches How many family branches own the firm ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3  
or more’




Altruism Family understanding and support ‘None’ to ‘Very 
strong’ (6 items)Reliance Trust among the family members
R_Personal Frequency of the personal relationships 
between the family members
R_Emotional Friendly personal relationships between 
family members
Values Defense and respect of the family values
Rituals
F_Christmas Frequency of Christmas, Easter, Carnival, 









P_Christmas Attendance of family members at 
Christmas, Easter, Carnival, family 
birthday and family members birthday 
celebrations






Conferences Frequency of family reunions ‘Never’  
to ‘Always’  
(6 items)
Gatherings Frequency of informal gatherings
Councils Family councils















Age of firms H6
Clusters H7
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tion of  
decision








Business Discussion of business of firm activity 
between owners and managers
‘Non-existing’  
to ‘Very High’  
(6 itens)Connivance Degree of understanding or complicity 





Involvement Percentage of shares held by shareholders 
with little or no direct involvement in the 
firm 
‘Non-existing’ 
to ‘Higher than 
50%’ (7 items)

















The research focuses on non-financial firms based in Portugal. The sample consists 
of 151 small and medium-sized family firms that were active in 2006 and most of the 
ownership rights were in the hands of a single family or branches of that family. The 
data was obtained in 2008 through a questionnaire that was mailed to the top managers 
of firms. We used a random list of 3,000 SMEs.
3. Methodology
We explored the primary sources of variation within the two groups of variables, apply-
ing a nonlinear principal component analysis by alternating least squares (PRINCALS 
in SPSS). The process provides an optimum quantification of the firms and categories of 
variables in the sense that they are as separate as possible in the dimensions studied and 
within each category firms are reasonably homogeneous. This analysis differs from clas-
sical principal component analysis (PCA) because it admits that the relationships may 
be non-linear and the variables measured in different scales (De Leeuw, Van Rijckevor-
sel 1980; Gifi 1985). Variable principal normalization was used. Data reduction resulted 
in factors consisting of variables that showed strong associations. These factors would 
optimally represent the original information in a reduced number of variables that can be 
End of Table 1
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seen as a kind of scale construction. The alternating least squares solution might reveal 
one or more groups of enterprises that dominate the solution. Such a marked deviation 
from the remaining population would then be regarded as a distinct group, identified 
by an indicator variable. To check whether the item set represented a single underlying 
dimension or two underlying dimensions, we used Categorical Principal Components 
Analysis (CATPCA). The analysis of the relationships between variables was based on 
the chi-squared test.
Additionally, a k-means cluster analysis was carried out to distinguish the groups of 
firms according to their characteristics.
4. Analysis and results
4.1. Descriptive analysis
The main owner of the family firm holds almost 60% of the capital. Regarding the char-
acteristics of the family, 81% of managers said that they have ‘strong’ or ‘very strong’ 
respect for family values, 73.3% said that they feel ‘understanding’ and/or ‘strong’ or 
‘very strong’ family support and 83.5% have a relationship of ‘strong’ or ‘very strong’ 
trust. 74% of managers said they had ‘strong’ or ‘very strong’ friendly relationships 
with the families. 82.6% meet ‘frequently’ or ‘very often’ at Christmas and 52.4% meet 
‘often’ or ‘very often’ at Easter. 63.3% celebrate family birthdays ‘always’ or ‘very 
often’, and 60% also meet ‘very often’ or ‘always’ to celebrate birthdays of family 
members.
Regarding the governance of family firms, in 87.5% of firms, there is only one family 
branch involved. The decision-making power was controlled by the founders in 49.3% 
of firms, by their sons or daughters in 19.2% and by several members of the families in 
24.7%. Only 4.1% of firms have managers who are not related to the family, and 2.1% 
share power between managers and family members. The firm’s activities are discussed 
in 57.7% of cases between managers and owners; 65.5% have a ‘high’ or ‘very high’ 
level of common understanding, approximately 60% meet ‘often’ or ‘very often’ for 
business matters, more than 62% attend informal meetings and more than 40% organize 
family councils to discuss business issues.
4.2. Exploratory analysis
In the bivariate analysis of variables, statistically significant relationships were found 
between family characteristics and corporate governance (Table 2). Decision-making is 
negatively associated with the level of communication between members and family 
values (trust relationships), and the frequency of Easter reunions (family rituals). The 
board size is positively related to informal meetings. With regard to the alignment of 
interests, there are significant associations in most of the variables that measure the 
characteristics of the family.
In the case of involvement in the management, a significant positive association was 
found between the number of generations and existing family branches, between the 
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number of family members and family conferences and informal meetings. A nega-
tive association was found between the inactive shareholders and friendly personal 
relationships, and between the number of generations and family conferences. With 
regard to openness to outside members, there is a significant association between non-
family shareholders and existing family branches and between external managers and 
frequency of reunions at Easter.
The principal components analysis solution (PCA) had a total percentage fit (eigen-
values) with no relative loss in the less restricted model. The inertia of the first princi-
pal plane (two-dimensional solutions) accounts for 43.1% of the variability (Table 3). 
The first eigenvalue is significantly higher than the second, meaning that even if the 
2 dimensions are considered the first dimension (horizontal) accounts for most of the 
information (28.20%).
To represent the information, we chose 2 dimensions that explain 43.1% and used a 
symmetrical normalization procedure that maximizes the distance between the variable 
categories, while simultaneously measuring the distances between non-similar firms 
(Fig. 2).
































No F_Managers .234 .074
No F_Shareholders –.071 –.215
Variance  
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The first dimension was defined by 10 variables, all of which are related to family ritu-
als. The second dimension was defined by 8 variables and divided into 3 groups: trust 
relationships, family reunions (Conferences), and alignment of interests. The variables 
related to governance mechanisms have no relevance in the definition of the first 2 latent 
dimensions because they show similar values among all firms in the study; however, it 
may be important in characterizing firms.
We performed a K-means cluster analysis from principal component analysis coordi-
nates. The cluster analysis yielded 3 distinct subgroups consisting of 18, 52 and 81 firms 
respectively, and characterized by different combinations of variables (Fig. 3). Firms 
that represent cluster 1 (green) essentially occupy the second quadrant, corresponding 
to the set of indicators for the family rituals group that presents a low value, i.e., the 
frequency with which they meet to participate in events is low (‘never’, ‘rarely’, ‘some-
times’) and the same applies to the Prestige indicator. Decision-making does not remain 
‘with the founder’ in 35% of these firms, and 17.6% of managers have nothing to do 
with the family (openness to outside members). They do not have a defined pattern in 
the trust relationship or family brand indicators.
The firms that form cluster 2 (yellow) essentially occupy the first quadrant and have 
high values for the variables: R-Emotional (95% ‘strong’ or ‘very strong’), Altruism 
(96% ‘strong’ or ‘very strong’), Reliance (92% ‘very strong’) and R-Personal (75.5% 
‘very strong’). The variable Values in the group trust relationships have high values 
(90% ‘strong’ or ‘very strong’). The variable Conferences also presents high values in 
the group family reunions (88.3% ‘frequently’, ‘often’ or ‘always’), Gatherings (85.7% 
‘often’ or ‘always’) and Councils (71.4% ‘often’ or ‘always’). All variables in the group 
Variable principal normalisation
Fig. 2. Representation of variables in the PRINCALS factor plan  
Note: Blue vectors refer to family characteristics variables; red vectors refer  
to the governance mechanisms variables.
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family reunions and the variable Prestige have high values (only 19.2% ‘never’ or ‘rare-
ly). In cluster 2, firms have high levels of Connivance (94.3% ‘high’ or ‘very high’) 
and Business (82.7% ‘high’ or ‘very high’). For the other variables, values are low or 
without a pattern.
The firms that form cluster 3 (pink) are distributed particularly in the third and fourth 
quadrant. There is no defined pattern of family group variables for this cluster of firms, 
assuming low values for the variables of the groups trust relationships and family re-
unions.
Finally, neither the sector nor the age influences the relationship between the character-
istics of the family firm and the governance mechanisms.
5. Discussion
For larger boards, having family reunions is reflected mainly in the alignment of inter-
ests, in the increased discussion within family businesses and in the complicity between 
the family members on the board of directors, particularly when less generations are 
involved and there are more family members in management. We notice that formal 
family meetings are adverse to new generations of shareholders, which, in turn, lend 
importance to the family brand. Family firms assume the role of family governance 
to ensure commitments between the firm and the family, share values and provide 
information to family members (Lank, Ward 2000; Gallo, Kenyon 2004). Usually, how-
ever, there is a joint adoption of internal and external mechanisms (Fernandez, Arrondo 
2005). The family’s characteristics influence the firm’s governance mechanisms, namely 
Fig. 3. Representation of variables and firms by cluster
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informal gatherings, and family councils or assemblies (Mustakallio et al. 2002). There-
fore, H1 is confirmed.
The relationships of trust between family members are negatively associated with a 
higher concentration of decision-making powers among the board members and with the 
existence of inactive members whenever there are friendly and affective relationships. 
Those relationships of trust are positively correlated with increased business discussion 
and complicity between family members, and also lead to altruism and family level of 
confidence, due to the fact that a higher concentration of decisions leads to a lower level 
of communication and a reduced influence of family values and rituals. Vileseca (2002), 
Mustakallio et al. (2002), and Jaffe and Lane (2004) confirm that trust relationships and 
family members influence decision-making and the alignment of interests. However, 
there are inconsistencies between the objectives of executives and families, resulting in 
adverse selection and the non-alignment of interests (Morck, Yeng 2003; Gomez-Mejia 
et al. 2001). Schulze et al. (2003) and Chrisman et al. (2004) consider that many of 
these problems should be traced to the lack of reciprocal altruism. H2 is thus confirmed.
When family firms involve family branches of different generations they prefer external 
shareholders. The family branches have no propensity to discuss business with family 
members. Also, family prestige is adverse to the concentration of decision-making in 
a family member. Various authors (e.g. Voordeckers et al. 2007) argue that the use of 
external managers benefits the family firm. However, Sacristán-Navarro and Gómez-
Ansón (2006) consider there to be a preference for turning to internal managers. H3 is 
therefore confirmed.
Families that establish greater trust among their members and choose to hold family 
councils have a greater alignment of interests, as reflected in their discussion of business 
and the complicity among their members, which runs counter to the concentration of 
decision-making. These relationships are specific for a group of firms. In turn, families 
practicing their own rituals also opt for external managers to run the family business, 
which corresponds to another group of firms, just as a larger number of family branches 
leads to a greater concentration of decision-making power. The adoption of family ritu-
als, including frequency and participation in Christmas celebrations, family parties and 
birthdays, leads to the alignment of interests reflected in increased discussion of family 
business, complicity between members and the use of external managers. However, the 
ritual of the Easter celebration contrasts with the concentration of decision-making and 
opens up opportunities for non-family managers. Lobel (1991) claims that the issues of 
family and work are strongly related to cultural beliefs, values and standards adopted by 
the family. This finding leads Johannisson and Huse (2000) to consider the importance 
of discussions during Christmas festivities as an important governance mechanism in 
family businesses. H4 is thus confirmed.
The analysis of the sector of activity of family firms and their age does not provide 
evidence of its effect on the relationship between family characteristics and mechanisms 
of governance, and so H5 and H6 cannot be confirmed.
Family firms with multiple generations and family members involved in decision-mak-
ing which do not adopt the rituals of family make up cluster 1. In cluster 2, firms where 
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family members set up their relationships based on individual trust, family reunions and 
recognition of the importance of the prestige of the family without family branches have 
a strong alignment of interests among family members with corporate interests. In clus-
ter 3, the various family branches are related to the concentration of decision-making 
power in the family business with larger boards and show a preference for non-family 
shareholders. The literature using such an approach in this field of analysis does not 
abound and H7 is confirmed.
Conclusions
This study generally finds that different family characteristics influence governance 
mechanisms. Family firms tend to group into different clusters based on relationships 
between family characteristics and governance mechanisms. We conclude that the pres-
tige of the family, relationships of trust and shared values, family rituals adopted and 
family reunions promote a strong alignment of interests among members of the family 
and family firms’ interest. We also observe that the family brand becomes important 
insofar as the generational succession of the family gradually moves the firm towards 
external shareholders and managers.
Another finding shows that family values are important in building relationships of trust 
between member-owners of the family firm and that active members are more likely to 
align their interests with the managers through relationships of complicity. In this sense, 
rituals and family reunions play a strong role in the alignment of interests and complic-
ity, which facilitates the selection of external managers. Furthermore, family reunions 
tend to be held on an informal basis when the boards are larger and are composed of 
family member managers.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on governance mechanisms and agency 
theory in family firms. However, its scope should be extended to firms in different con-
texts. It presents a relevant innovative contribution to theory and practice by focusing 
on small and medium-sized family firms and reveals the influence of family rituals on 
governance mechanisms. The interest and importance of family firms indicates the need 
to continue researching how they are influenced by other family characteristics and dif-
ferent mechanisms of governance. Future studies should also examine the implications 
for performance.
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